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Fantasy, Celebrity, and Homicide 
Thomas Morawetz * 
Introduction 
One of the most disturbing aspects of the murder trial of Oren thai 
James Simpson, the defendant's status as a celebrity, is the least discussed. 
Both scholarly and journalistic commentators are rightly preoccupied with 
the effects of race, gender, and publicity on the effort to achieve justice. 
These issues, however, are not unique to this trial and are familiar 
concerns of observers (and participants) in many legal contexts, reflecting 
general concerns about the gap between our practices and our ideals. 
Attitudes toward race and gender present both practical and theoretical 
obstacles to justice. As a practical matter, one may question whether the 
performance of significant actors (judges, jurors, attorneys) is distorted by 
bias and prejudice. As a theoretical concern, one may ask whether any 
understanding of the circumstances leading to the trial and of the trial itself 
is uncolored by partiality and perspective. Concerns about publicity, on 
the other hand, tend to be purely practical and focus on how public 
scrutiny affects the performance of all actors. Common law courts in 
Canada and England, mindful of these dangers, bar coverage that is 
constitutionally safeguarded under our own Constitution. I 
Although cases that prompt reflection about racial assumptions, gender 
roles and expectations, and the distorting effects of publicity are common, 
celebrity trials are much less so. Simpson's celebrity status is of a special 
kind. He is not the kind of celebrity defendant, such as Patricia Hearst, 
John Gotti or Adolph Eichmann, who owes his notoriety to involvement 
in crime. Nor is he known as a political or business figure, like Clark 
Clifford or Leona Helmsley. 0.1. Simpson's fame, insofar as it ante ceded 
his murder trial, is more directly tied to our imagination than to our 
* The author is the Tapping Reeve Professor of Law and Ethics at the University of 
Connecticut School of Law. The author wishes to thank Robert Clark for his help in 
researching and editing this article. 
1. See GEOFFREY ROBERTSON AND ANDREW G.L. NICOL, MEDIA LAW (2d ed. 1990); 
PATRICK BIRKINSHAW, GoVERNMENT AND INFORMATION passim (1990). 
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institutions. Both as sports hero and as movie actor, he has been the 
subject of special narratives and the object of publicly shared fantasies. 
There is no inherent reason why the murder trial of a sports he-
ro/movie star cannot achieve procedural and substantive justice. 2 But the 
Simpson trial offers special obstacles and opportunities for subverting the 
kind of ideal scenario of fairness and impartiality to which the rules and 
practices of criminal law aspire. The most obvious reason for this, the 
particular celebrity of the defendant, is also the most subtle. In the four 
main parts of this paper, I shall trace the paradoxical implications of trying 
someone who is famous as a subject of many kinds of fantasies (parts I and 
II), consider the truth-eliciting mission of a criminal trial and the role of 
attorneys as agents of the court in light of these implications (part III), and 
sketch the jurisprudential implications of this predicament: the pursuit by 
the court of a master narrative of discrete events in the face of an 
explosion of seductive narrative possibilities (part IV). 
I. Star-gazing 
Most defendants in widely-publicized trials, from Captain Dreyfus3 to 
Jean Harris4, owe their notoriety to the events that precipitate the trial 
itself. Their alleged criminality is the reason for their fame. Other 
defendants may be public figures long before they are tried, but their 
activity as public figures is continuous with the subject matter of their 
alleged criminality. This is as true of Clark Clifford as it is of John Gotti. 
But it is not true of O. 1. Simpson. 
The activities for which Simpson had been best known were not merely 
discontinuous with murder in the obvious sense that he was not seen as a 
man disposed to criminal violence and murderous passions. They were 
2. Consider, however, the observations of former Los Angeles District Attorney Ira 
Reiner: "It is always extremely difficult to convict a celebrity. It is more difficult to 
convict someone who is a hero. Before a lot of this, 0.1. Simpson was an authentic 
American Hero, an icon." Andrew Blum, 0.1. Will Walk, NAT'L L. J., Oct. 10, 1994, 
at 1, A24. 
Making the same point in more flowery language, Lewis Lapham observes, in regard 
to O. J. Simpson's would-be flight from justice in his Ford Bronco, "the reverent crowds 
gathering under the eucalyptus trees on Sunset Boulevard had come to pay homage to what 
passes in late-twentieth-century America for the presence of divinity. The question of 
Simpson's guilt or innocence wasn't as important as his descent from the starry heavens 
of network television-a demigod on the order of the doomed Orestes in flight from the 
pursuing Furies." Lewis H. Lapham, Terms of Endearment, 289 HARPER'S MAGAZINE 7, 
7 (1994). 
3. Roughly one hundred years after its occurrence, the Dreyfus affair remains one of 
the most discussed trials of all time. See MICHAEL BRUNS, DREYFUS: A FAMILY AFFAIR 
(1991); RICHARD GRIFFITHS, THE USE OF ABUSE: THE POLEMICS OF THE DREYFUS 
AFFAIR AND ITS AFTERMATH (1991). 
4. See DIANA TRILLING, MRS. HARRIS: THE DEATH OF THE SCARSDALE DIET DOCTOR 
(1981); SHANA ALEXANDER, VERY MUCH A LADY (1983). 
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also discontinuous in the deeper sense that, as a sports hero and movie 
star, he has been a figure of fantasy rather than reality, a central player in 
artificial public dramas of recreation and imagination. 
In drawing implications from this fact, we must first distinguish sports 
fantasies from movie fantasies. Sports heroes deploy real skills in real 
time, and they play roles in their own name. A significant part of their 
achievement is not a matter of pretense, of assuming an artificial and 
temporary persona. But, at the same time, sports would not be central to 
our collective consciousness if they were not a focus and vehicle of 
fantasies. It hardly needs to be said that persons experience victory and 
defeat vicariously through sports, and that they idealize and demonize 
players. 
The "halo effect,"5 according to social psychologists, is the tendency 
to presume that heroes in one domain are heroes in all. Sports heroes 
become role models. Fans seek to emulate not only their success on the 
playing field but also their presumed success in life as well. In doing so, 
fans tend to resist counterevidence that sports heroes have the same 
failings, inconsistencies, and complexities that bedevil mere mortals. 
While movie stars are also valued for real skills, these skills are 
inherently ones of simulation and pretense. Unlike sports heroes, they do 
not have a single persona characterized by genuine victories. Fans are 
more comfortable with them adopting multiple personae that are explicitly 
artificial. Movie stars are the agents through which audiences engage in 
fantasy. Even though failure to distinguish actors from their roles may be 
a sign of naivete, all of us to some extent experience actors as their parts. 
To do otherwise is to forego the suspension of disbelief that is considered 
essential to the experience of movies and plays.6 
The seductive confusion of actor with role is especially likely when the 
heroism of a charismatic sports star is transposed to the movies. Imputed 
superhumanity is carried over intact, as the movie persona spends the 
psychological capital earned in the sports career. In the instance of 0.1. 
Simpson, this superhumanity could hardly be illustrated better than through 
his role as television spokesman for Hertz car rental. In this context, his 
performance implied that ordinary laws, including the law of gravity, 
simply did not apply to him.7 
5. A "halo effect" is "a predisposition to admire all of a person's actions, work, etc., 
because of an estimable quality or action in the past." RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF 
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 863 (2d ed. 1987). 
6. This idea is explored in countless books and articles. See STANLEY CAVELL, THE 
WORLD VIEWED: REFLECTIONS OF THE ONTOLOGY OF FILM 25-29 (1971); PAULINE KAEL, 
I LOST IT AT THE MOVIES (1965). 
7. The Hertz advertising campaign, broadcast on national television in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, depicted Simpson flying through the air into the seat of a Hertz rental car. 
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Invested as we are in the fantasy lives of sports heroes and movie 
stars, we are ambivalent toward the real facts of their lives. While many 
persons seek gossip in fan magazines, tabloid newspapers, and television 
programs, such gossip stokes the economic engines of pseudo-journalism 
only when it fuels the fantasies of its audience. As a result, the gossip is 
loosely, if at all, grounded in fact. Rather, it elaborates audiences' 
secondary fantasies about the lives of sports heroes and movie stars, 
fantasies that are constructed from the primary fantasies played out in the 
sports events and movies themselves. 
II. Deeper into (the Concept of) Fantasy 
The notion of fantasy, as I have been using it, rests on the distinction 
between fantasy and reality, or fiction and truth. The word "fantasy" 
commonly has two meanings. The simpler meaning is that "fantasy" 
merely refers to what is false, any claim about the life and deeds of an 
individual that is at odds with fact. A more complex understanding of 
"fantasy" refers to artificial personae and events. The rules of sporting 
events or the scripts of movies and plays, for example, are constructed by 
imagination and require audiences to use their own experiences and beliefs 
to uncover meaning. 8 
The seemingly indispensable distinction between truth and fantasy in 
this context is vulnerable to criticism and attack. Though some facts are 
considered "hard," or easily resolved by observable data, such as the fact 
that Jones either was or was not in Kansas City on January 1, other facts 
may be a matter of endless dispute. 9 Attributions of motive, intention, 
8. Psychologists remind us that fantasy is both an individual and a collective 
experience. Thus, each of us plays out in our imaginations all kinds of events that we 
know are not real, imaginings that reflect our hopes, fears and anticipations. Most, but not 
all of us, can tell the difference between our fantasies and reality most of the time. The 
reservoir of images and stories from which we draw our fantasies has, in part, contents that 
are idiosyncratic to our own history and, in larger part, contents that reflect shared cultural, 
political and social experiences. 
9. In the early part of the twentieth century, philosophers were much preoccupied with 
the epistemological status of our knowledge of the external world, in particular with the 
relationship between what I am calling hard facts and soft facts. Other ways of referring 
to this distinction is in terms of brute facts and inferential facts. See BERTRAND RUSSELL, 
OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD (1929); G. E. Moore, Proof of an External 
World, in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS (1959); JOHN L. POLLOCK, KNOWLEDGE AND 
JUSTIFICATION (1974). More recent epistemological investigations, influenced perhaps by 
the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, look at all of our knowledge claims in terms of the 
patterns of assumptions and justification in which they are embedded. See LUDWIG 
WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INvESTIGATIONS (1959); HILARY PuTNAM, REALISM WITH 
A HUMAN FACE (1990). 
The distinction between hard and soft facts, whatever its epistemological status may 
be, is intuitively suggested by the distinction in criminal law between questions involving 
acts (actus reus) and those involving mental states (mens rea). It is generally assumed that 
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mood, and character are "soft," or more open to a variety of interpreta-
tions, such as whether Jones was greedy, reckless, giddy, or inhumane in 
his conduct in Kansas City on January 1. With regard to these latter 
"facts," one person's truth may be another person's fiction. The 
distinction between hard and soft facts, however, is one of degree. In 
principle, one can accumulate relevant evidence to make an ever more 
convincing case about Jones' motives, intention, mood, or character. A 
large part of our discourse, whether in informal conversation or in formal 
trials, consists of hardening soft facts by presenting and interpreting 
evidence. 
Thus, the observation that some factual claims are soft does not 
challenge the dichotomy between fantasy and reality, fiction and truth; it 
simply takes note of the difficulties we sometimes have, and the disagree-
ments we therefore experience, in determining which is which. But a 
strain of postmodern lO reasoning represents a wholesale rejection of these 
distinctions. According to this view, any so-called event can be seen and 
described in endless ways, depending on the background, dispositions and 
powers of the observer. Also, references to "truth" and "reality" betray 
a naive faith in what can be called a "master narrative," an ideal account 
of events "as they objectively are." Postmodern critics assert that there is 
no master narrative, merely (potentially) conflicting individual narra-
tives. II 
From this standpoint, what we have been calling "fantasy" in its more 
complex sense can be generalized to all descriptions of events and 
the former can be "directly" observed while the latter are inferential. Of course, to say 
that act can be directly observed is not to say that they are always or generally directly 
observed; in particular cases, our claims about persons' acts are generally inferential, e.g. 
from other (trustworthy) persons' reports, etc. 
10. Consider the following discussion by Jean-Francois Lyotard: 
A postmodern artist or writer is in the position of a philosopher: the text he 
writes, the work he produces are not in principle governed by preestab-
lished rules, and they cannot be judged according to a determining 
judgment, by applying familiar categories to the text or to the work .... 
[I]t must be clear that it is our business [as writers] not to supply reality but 
to invent allusions to the conceivable which cannot be presented. 
JEAN-FRANCOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE 
81 (1985). "Postmodernism means the end of a single world view and, by extension, ... 
a resistance to single explanations." Charles Jencks, Introduction to THE POST-MODERN 
READER 7 (Charles Jencks, ed., 1992). 
11. "Master narrative-how else to translate Lyotard's grand recit? ... [W]hat made 
the grand recits of modernity master narratives if not the fact that they were all narratives 
of mastery, of man seeking his telos in the conquest of nature? What function did these 
narratives play other than to legitimize Western man's self-appointed mission of 
transforming the entire planet in his own image? ... What is at stake, then, is not only 
the status of narrative, but of representation itself." Craig Owens, The Discourseo/Others: 
Feminist and Postmodernism, in THE POST-MODERN READER 339 (Charles Jencks ed., 
1992). 
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experiences. Everyone from the politician speaking to her constituents and 
posturing in Congress to the corporate executive planning a marketing 
strategy to the professor of law presiding over a class is playing a role, 
acting a fantasy that is not significantly different from the roles of movie 
actors. Attempts by observers to pin down the reality of the politician's 
life are bound to be frustrated and to collapse into a set of competing 
narratives, each one vulnerable to the allegation that it is merely that 
person's own fantasy. 12 In this sense, what we are accustomed to doing 
overtly in thinking about actors and sports heroes is what we do covertly 
in all of our considerations of the lives of others. We are all actors and 
storytellers at all times. 
III. Trial, Truth, and Fantasy 
I shall postpone until part IV any consideration of the merits of the 
postmodern reduction of truth and reality to fiction and fantasy and its 
critique of the "myth" of an elusive master narrative. In this part, I shall 
consider how a postmodern account plays havoc with the bases of legal 
practice, specifically with the process of trying criminal cases. 
The practice of criminal law cannot dispense with the notion of truth. 
Although eliciting truth is only one of several goals of a trial, and although 
some aspects of trial conduct may consciously subvert the search for truth, 
few would deny that the job of the jury is to distinguish truth from 
falsehood. This job extends equally to both soft and hard facts, i.e., to 
questions of intent as well as questions of action. 13 
The adversarial roles of criminal attorneys, as prosecution and defense, 
are only partially defined by the pursuit of truth. One familiar, although 
widely disputed, justification for the adversarial system is that it is an 
efficient vehicle for eliciting truth. 14 Within the system, however, 
attorneys are only required to be truthful in certain ways, e.g. by the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 15 Model Rule 3.4 (e) of Profes-
12. "[Language] can never explain the world, or at least, when it claims to explain the 
world, it does so only the better to conceal its ambiguity." Roland Barthes, Authors and 
Writers, in A BARTHES READER 187 (Susan Sontag ed., 1982). In a series of essays, 
Barthes applies the notion to virtually every area of cultural, political and social experience. 
See Roland Barthes, MYTHOLOGIES (1973). 
13. See supra note 9. 
14. The effectiveness of the adversary system as a vehicle for eliciting truth is one of the 
most fundamentally disputed issues in legal ethics. Monroe Freedman is one of the most 
single-minded defenders of the adversary system on those grounds. See MONROE 
FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 28-33 (1990). His critics are numerous. 
See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE 50-103 (1988); Marvin Frankel, The Search 
for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1031 (1975). 
15. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct were approved by the House of Delegates 
of the American Bar Association in 1983. A significant majority of the states have adopted 
some version of the Model Rules; all have modified the text as adopted by the ABA. 
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sional Conduct mandates that " [a lawyer shall not], in trial, allude to any 
matter that the lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant or that will 
not be supported by admissible evidence." 16 Further, according to Model 
Rule 3.3 (a)(4), "[a lawyer shall not knowingly] offer evidence the lawyer 
knows to be false. "17 Finally, according to Model Rule 3.4 (b), "[a 
lawyer shall not] falsify evidence, counselor assist a witness to testify 
falsely." 18 
A layperson is likely to interpret these provisions differently from a 
lawyer. The former would find in them a broad mandate for lawyers at 
trial to work together in eliciting the truth. It would seem at odds with a 
lawyer's task, for example, to try to persuade the jury to consider and 
believe an account of the relevant facts that the attorney believes to be 
false. Having first distinguished to her own satisfaction fact from fiction, 
a lawyer would then be required to assemble evidence for a narrative that 
is in accord with the truth. 
In fact, both laypersons and lawyers may recognize this account of a 
lawyer's conduct as naive. Laypersons, informed by journalists and legal 
fiction, interpret lawyers' rhetorical devices as calculated to advantage their 
clients' stories in ways that betray the obvious mandate of the Model 
Rules. Lawyers, on the other hand, argue that laypersons read the Rules 
too broadly. The rules do prohibit introduction of certain facts, such as 
a witness' marital history, when they are not relevant, and require that 
lawyers present evidentiary support for any claim they want the jury to 
believe. But the Rule does not demand congruence between the lawyer's 
own beliefs about relevant events and the account she will ask the jury to 
believe. 19 Similarly, Rules 3.3 (a) (4) and 3.4 (b) prohibit the introduc-
tion of material evidence or testimony that the lawyer knows to be false. 
The lawyer, for example, may not submit a piece of clothing as belonging 
to the defendant when she knows it does not, and she may not introduce 
testimony that includes deliberate lies.20 The Rules do not prohibit her, 
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983). 
16. MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4 (e) (1983). 
17. MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 (a)(4) (1983). 
18. MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4 (b) (1983). 
19. Indeed, many experts on the role of the criminal defense attorney suggest that the 
only way of testing the strength of the prosecution's case is by asking the jury to consider 
alternative scenarios. Doing so is part of the defense attorney's obligation, according to 
this view, and it is irrelevant whether or not she believes the stories she constructs. See 
FREEDMAN, supra note 14, at chs. 2, 5. 
20. It is well settled that Rule 3.3 (a)(4) prohibits the use of perjured testimony. The 
Comment to Rule 3.3, however, notes that "the most difficult situation ... arises in a 
criminal case where the accused insists on testifying when the lawyer knows that the 
testimony is perjurious." The Comment critically discusses various controversial 
"resolutions of this dilemma" and concludes that "if withdrawal will not remedy the 
situation or is impossible, the advocate should make disclosure [of the fact of perjury) to 
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however, from using genuine evidence or true statements in a deceptive 
way, a way that leads the jury to infer that which she personally believes 
to be false. 
Accordingly, the Model Rules allow lawyers more latitude than is 
apparent from an untutored reading. To be sure, lawyers and scholars 
differ with regard to the proper use of that latitude. 21 Some argue that 
the lawyer's own beliefs about the truth are irrelevant to the accounts that 
she may legitimately develop for the jury in the defense of her client:22 
"defense counsel has no ... obligation to ascertain or present the truth. 
Our system assigns him a different mission . . . preventing the conviction 
of the innocent. . . . If he can confuse a witness, even a truthful one, . . . 
that will be the normal course.,,23 
Others argue for narrower constraints. In a widely cited and discussed 
article, for example, Harry Subin criticizes lawyers who are "prepared to 
stand before the jury posing as an officer of the court in search of the 
truth, while trying to fool the jurors into believing a wholly fabricated 
story. "24 He sees as disingenuous the suggestion that "the lawyer cannot 
possibly be sufficiently certain of the truth to impose his or her view of it 
on the client's case.,,25 
Proponents of the view that defense attorneys are not tethered to the 
truth-seeking process and function instead "to put the State to its proof, to 
put the State's case in its worst possible light,"26 may execute that role 
in different ways. First, they may cast doubt on the State's account by 
showing that acts and events can be seen in more than one way or that 
witnesses may be mis-remembering or dissembling. Second, they may 
construct alternative scenarios and make the argument that the outcome (in 
the Simpson case, the deaths of the victims) is the result of a wholly 
independent set of actions. They may, in other words, construct 
alternative stories. 27 
the court." 
21. William Simon offers a useful general discussion of lawyers' "tactics that cannot 
plausibly be viewed either as assisting the trier in making an informed determination or as 
vindicating specific intrinsic procedural rights." See William H. Simon, The Ethics of 
Criminal Defense, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1703 (1993). 
22. See Simon H. Rifkind, The Lawyer's Role and Responsibility in Modern Society, 30 
THE RECORD 534 (1975). 
23. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 257-58 (1967) (White, J., dissenting in part 
and concurring in part). 
24. Harry 1. Subin, The Criminal Lawyer's "Different Mission": Reflections on the 
"Right" to Present a False Case, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 125, 148 (1987). 
25. [d. 
26. Wade, 388 U.S. at 257-58 (White, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). 
27. An interesting empirical study of the ways in which juries can be led to disregard 
evidence, to presume the existence of evidentiary support when little exists, and to be 
mislead in other ways is presented in Saul M. Kassin, The American Jury: Handicapped 
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To what extent must alternative stories of that kind be grounded in 
evidence? As defense attorneys construct such stories, how is the mandate 
of 3.4 (e) satisfied? Consider two different ways that these scenarios may 
be related to the evidence. Model Rule 3.4 (e) anticipates a standard 
situation in which the relationship is one of plausibility. The jury is asked 
to consider whether the story is plausible in light of the evidence, whether 
the story is the most plausible account, beyond reasonable doubt, of all 
available accounts. 28 
A different relationship between stories and evidence is that of logical 
consistency. By this much weaker standard, the jury is asked whether any 
evidence is logically incompatible with the offered account or, alternative-
ly, whether they are consistent with each other. Logical consistency is the 
weakest possible kind of relationship, and an indefinite array of implausi-
ble stories may all be consistent with available evidence. To the extent 
that there is slippage from a higher standard of plausibility to merely one 
of consistency, the jury's role is radically changed. The jury may come 
to operate under the assumption that all stories consistent with the evidence 
are to be considered equally seriously and are presumptively equally 
plausible.29 
One may see the conduct of Simpson's defense attorneys from this 
perspective. In raising the possibility that a premeditated and comprehen-
sive police conspiracy underlies the established facts of the case,30 and 
in the Pursuit of Justice, 51 OHIO ST. L. J. 687 (1990). 
28. The Due Process Clause of the Constitution has been held to require "proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged." In re Winship, 
397 U. S. 358, 364 (1970). Model Rule 3.4 (e) refers, of course, not to the standard that 
the jury must use in evaluating the evidence, but to the minimal requirements the lawyer 
must satisfy in presenting the case. 
29. The situation that I am criticizing, the conceptual move from a standard of 
knowledge involving plausibility to one involving logical inconsistency, has long been 
familiar in philosophical discussions of skepticism. A typical skeptical dilemma raises the 
question of how one knows that one is not dreaming or hallucinating. The suggestion is 
that any evidence one seeks is equally impeachable in the light of the hypothesis that one 
is dreaming or hallucinating. Accordingly, all evidence is logically consistent with that 
hypothesis. The skeptic concludes that, as a result, one has no justification for rejecting 
the hypothesis-and must therefore entertain it as a serious alternative to the belief that one 
is awake or not hallucinating. 
The flaw in this argument is the last step: the inference from logical consistency to 
equal plausibility-the idea, in other words, that one must entertain the hypothesis merely 
because it is logically consistent with what one knows: "we are just in one of the 
characteristic situations of philosophical skepticism: which allows us the alternatives of 
meaning something different from what we do mean, or of being forever unsure; because 
the standard for being sure while meaning what we do mean is set self-contradictorily 
high." P. F. STRAWSON, INDIVIDUALS 34 (1959). 
30. For a brief and scathing discussion of the implausibility of this hypothesis and of the 
popUlarity of conspiracy theories in general, see Bruce Handy, A Conspiracy of Dunces, 
TIME, May 22, 1995, at 82. 
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raising the alternative possibility that the murders are the consequences of 
drug-dealing by friends of the victims, they are saying that these scenarios 
are consistent with what is known. Plausibility, in the form of independent 
evidence that establishes the likelihood of these scenarios, seems of 
secondary concern-or of no concern at all. 
Given this methodological shift, defense attorneys may see themselves 
as licensed to lead the jury through the domains of fantasy with scenarios 
drawn not from the world of common experience but the world of movie 
plots and tabloid speculation. In promulgating these suggestions, they may 
assume that our standards (and the jury's standards) for considering these 
accounts have merged with the standards that we entertain when we 
entertain ourselves. The search for truth becomes a search for the most 
exciting or arousing account that is consistent with the known facts. It is 
bizarrely appropriate that Simpson, as the creature of two separate worlds 
of fantasy, sports and movies, continues (in the scenarios of his defense 
attorneys) to inhabit these domains. 
These apparent shifts in defense strategy can be seen in two ways. On 
one hand, one may argue that they merely represent the logical implica-
tions of strategies that artful defense attorneys often use. Accordingly, the 
devolution of defense scenarios from consideration of truth to comparative 
fantasies should be recognized as a constant temptation for defense 
attorneys. This case would be unusual only to the extent that it also 
happens to reflect the pre-existing background of this defendant and the 
unconscious expectations of the public. On the other hand, one may see 
the exploitation of movie-based fantasies by the defense team as a 
deliberate and cynical strategy designed to take advantage of Simpson's 
image and of the general suspension of critical judgment with which sports 
heroes, movie stars, and other totems of gossip are typically regarded. 
IV. Truth, Narrative, and Perspective 
We saw above that many postmodern theorists argue that the 
distinction between truth and fantasy is naive and exists only to be 
deconstructed. According to this account, the cultural artifacts that we 
label "fiction" or "fantasy" differ only in degree from the narratives that 
make up our shared experience of history, politics or law. The latter 
domains, like the former, consist only of multiple competing narratives 
that are shared and debated within large or small interpretive communities. 
We have also seen that this critique wreaks havoc on the assumptions 
that make criminal trials possible. 31 This critique implies that the basic 
31. Any attempt to justify the presentation of multiple fantasies, e. g., those involving 
police conspiracies or wars among drug dealers, as multiple competing narratives in this 
case represents, of course, vulgarization and abuse of the underlying theory of 
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instruction to a jury, to arrive at a decision about the truth of legally 
relevant events, is inherently misconceived. The mandate to juries 
presupposes that there is a master narrative that is "true" and that the 
juries' role is to find that master narrative. 
In the Simpson trial, doubts about a master narrative would be 
emphasized by the view that jurors, lawyers and observers bring their own 
experiences and assumptions to bear on the situation. The variant readings 
that individuals give to the evidence and other observations, and the 
various narratives that they are disposed to tell and find persuasive, can be 
deconstructed in light of their personal histories and beliefs. Doing so 
involves seeing them both as individuals and as members of particular 
racial groups, genders and social classes. No group is inherently without 
presuppositions. 
A consequence of this deconstructive approach is that any resolution 
of this trial will be seen as irreducibly political and will be explained in 
terms of the vindication of certain political biases and the defeat of others. 
Insofar as participants and observers come to reject any clear distinction 
between truth and fantasy, the only test of a narrative is the pragmatic one 
of whether it wins adherents. Any narrative that is likely to win adherents 
becomes admissible. In this sense, Simpson is an exemplary postmodern 
defendant, carrying with him an array of available roles in the popular 
imagination. 
Obviously, the mode of analysis that I have called "deconstructive" is, 
and is intended to be, subversive because it makes unavailable (or at least 
encumbers seriously) the notion of truth and seems to erase substantially 
the distinction between presuppositions of judgment and outright bias. 
Each of these jeopardized notions is essential to the way we think of legal 
processes, specifically of litigation, and the roles of lawyers, judges, and 
jurors. Thus, jurors must believe that there is one true, one veridical, 
account (a master narrative) of the relevant events, and that it is their job 
to determine it. Although they may and should recognize that the process 
of judgment has presuppositions, they must at the same time seek to free 
themselves of bias. 32 
The postmodern challenge to the objectivist epistemological premises 
of our legal procedures implicates the deepest concerns of contemporary 
postmodernism. Theorists who reject the idea of a master narrative surely do not believe 
that the process of trying to determine the relevant "hard facts» is, in principle, 
misconceived and must be aborted. They do not deny that the identity of the assailant of 
Nicole Brown and Ronald Goldman is a question of fact rather than a matter of 
interpretation, dependent on the assumptions of the interpreter. Rather, they might argue 
that such questions, such as whether racism seriously tainted the police investigation, 
cannot be answered objectively. See supra text accompanying notes 10 through 12. 
32. Observers will, of course, disagree about the extent to which this is possi-
ble-<iisagree, that is, about underlying features of human nature. 
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legal theory. It is impossible to do justice to them in so brief a discussion, 
just as it is difficult to avoid caricaturing the positions at issue. Nonethe-
less, the postmodem approach is clearly echoed by some critical legal 
theorists, including some critical feminist and race theorists. 33 These 
writers draw attention both to the pervasiveness with which unacknowl-
edged bias and unquestioned presumptions permeate legal, social and 
political discourse and to the lack of shared criteria for distinguishing mere 
narratives from a master narrative, for distinguishing mere beliefs from 
truth. 34 
For present purposes, perhaps it is enough to distinguish two different 
roles that these critical approaches to law can have, one of them salutary 
and the other destructive. The salutary role is that of demanding vigilance 
on the part of each actor and each observer in questioning her presupposi-
tions and ferreting out her biases. Similarly, critical thinking suggests that 
we must be cautious in elevating our own narratives, our own way of 
assembling relevant facts into a master narrative and calling it "truth." 
Thus, critical thinking emphasizes that presumption-free inquiry is an 
incoherent notion, whereas bias-free inquiry is an ideal. 
These reminders are not revolutionary and subversive but are merely 
restatements of the parameters of rational discourse, principles that we 
have always known. They do not undermine the processes of trial but 
instead reinforce them and make them possible. In this sense, they must 
33. Consider, for example, the following observations by a leading feminist theorist: 
Feminist analysis begins with the principle that objective reality is a myth 
. . . . The business of living and progressing within our disciplines requires 
that we give up on 'objective' verification at various critical moments, such 
as when we rely upon gravity, or upon the existence of others, or upon the 
principle of verification itself. Feminism insists upon epistemological and 
psychological sophistication in law: Jurisprudence will forever be stuck in 
a postrealist battle of subjectivities, with all the discomfort that has 
represented. 
Ann Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE LJ. 1378, 
1400-1401, (1986). 
The apparent abandonment by some critical theorists of the notion of objectivity in 
shared discourse has prompted some observers to suggest that critical legal studies imply 
"the death of law." Owen Fiss, The Death of the Law, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1986). 
Fiss substantially modified his indictment in a later work. See Owen Fiss, The Law 
Regained, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 245 (1988). 
34. These observations derive some of their impact from ambiguity. It is important, for 
example, to distinguish presuppositions from biases. Reasoning without presupposition is 
impossible; every instance of reasoning presupposes some beliefs and convictions that are 
accepted without question. Bias-free reasoning, on the other hand, is a desirable and 
realizable goal, if biases are seen as beliefs and presuppositions that are unjustifiable. 
Similarly, the conclusion that one cannot arrive at a so-called "master narrative," namely 
an account of an event or series of events that is objective and that is the mirror of 
"reality," does not in itself put in question the project of comparing narratives as better or 
worse in terms of articulated criteria, among which may be the bias-free ideal. 
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be distinguished from the genuinely revolutionary, genuinely subversive 
notion that the effort to distinguish presupposition from bias, truth from 
fiction, reality from fantasy, is doomed. The latter suggestion is that we 
must treat all narratives as equally suspect and therefore all narratives as 
equally legitimate. This notion is one that we entertain at our peril and 
that, in the end, we have no good reason to accept. In the Simpson trial, 
the responsibilities of all participants-the accused, the jurors, the 
attorneys, the judge, and all commentators-must be defined in terms of 
discovering the difference between fantasy and reality and acting 
accordingly. 

